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INJURIES BY ANIMALS.
agreement is dissolved and he is at liberty to sell them to any other
person." The same doctrine seems to be maintained by the cases
of Bloxam vs. Sanders,1 Bloxam vs. Nash,2 McLean vs. Dunn.3
In this latter case, Best, Oh. J. says : "It is admitted that perish-
able articles may be re-sold. But if articles are not perishable,
prices may alter in a few days or a few hours. It is most con-
venient that when a party refuses to take the goods he has pur-
chased, they should be re-sold, and that he should be liable to the
loss, if any, upon the re-sale." '
G. G. W.
Boston, Hass.
INJURIES BY ANIMALS.5
It is now a firmly established doctrine of our law, that the liabi-
lity of the owner of an animal, for injury which it has committed
on another man's person or animals, depends on such owner's know-
ledge of its having a propensity to cause such mischief. Thus,
where a declaration stated that the defendant kept a fierce mongrel
mastiff, which he improperly allowed to be loose, and which had
bitten the plaintiff, Holt, 0. J., and Turton, J., held that the de-
claration was bad for not averring that the plaintiff had notice of
its mischievous qualities; Gould, J., thinking, however, that the
averment of ferocity was enough, as the plaintiff had not kept the
dog safe. (Mason vs. Keeling, Ld. Raym. 606; 12 Mod. 332.)
And, again, it was held, that if a dog chases sheep, &c., without
setting on, or notice before to the master, an action did not lie.
(Lutw. 119; Dy. 25 b, 29 a; 1 in. Ab. 234; Card vs. Case, 5
0. B. 622; Thomas vs. Morgan, 2 0., M. & R. 496.) And where
S4B. &C. 941. 29 B. &C. 145.
3 4 Ding. 722; 1 M. & P. 761.
4 So also decided in Newhall vs. Vargas, 15 MIaine, 314. In Sands vs. Taylor,
5 Jo. R. 410, Kent, Ch. J. says: "It would be unreasonable to oblige him (vendor)
to let the article perish on his hands, and run the risk of the solvency of the
buyer."
5 From the "London Jurist."
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the declaration -in an action stated that a man so negligently kept
his horse that it broke out and bit the defendant's mares, (Sutchett
vs. .ltlham, Freem. 534,) and where the declaration was for keep-
ing a bull which was accustomed to run at people, and had injured
the defendant, (Buzendin vs. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; Bayntine vs.
Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90) judgment was arrested for want of a scienter.
If, however, the owner knows the mischievous character of his
animal, he will- be liable. Thus, where a man had kept dogs which
he knew were accustomed to bite sheep, he has been held
liable for such sheep-biting; (R. Cr. Cas. 487; Dy. 25 b; 2
Sid. 254; Hartley vs. Halliwell, 1 B. & Al. 620; 2 Stark. 620;
aething vs. Morgan, 29 Law T. 106;) and where a man had kept
a boar which he knew was accustomed to bite animals, and it bit the
plaintiff's mare, (Jenkins vs. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109; 2 Salk.
662;) or a dog, knowing that it was accustomed to bite mankind,
and it bit the plaintiff, (Cropper vs. Mathews, 2 Sid. 127; Smith vs.
Pela, 2 Str. 1264; Charlwood vs. areig, 3 Car. & Kirwin, 46;
Jackson vs. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563; Judge vs. Cox, 1 Stark.
285;) or a dog, knowing it was accustomed to bite pigs, and it bit
the plaintiff's pigs, (1 Vin. Ab. 234;) or a bull, knowing it would
attack men, and it attacked the plaintiff, (Blackman vs. Simmons,
3 Car. & P. 138; Hudson vs. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697;) or a dog
which he knew would worry cattle, and it worried the plaintiff's
cattle, (-Thomas vs. Morgan, 2 0., M. & R. 496;) or a monkey
which he knew would bite men, and it bit the plaintiff, (Hay vs.
Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101; 10 Jur., part 1, p. 692,) he has been held
liable. It is, therefore, clear, that if a man keeps an animal which
he knows will attack a particular class of animals, and it attacks
one of that class, or which he knows will attack mankind, and it
attacks a human being, such owner will be liable. But suppose
the owner only knows of its having attacked one class of ani-
mals, will he be liable for its attacking another class ? or if he only
knows of its attacking animals, and it attacks a man, or vice versa,
will he be liable for the latter attack? In the case of Jenkins vs.
Turner, (supra,) where the declaration charged the defendant with
keeping a boar which he knew bit animals, and which bit the plain-
INJUMIES BY ANIM IALS.
tiff's mare, it was moved, in arrest of judgment, first, that "ani-
reals" was too general a term, and might include frogs, &c., in
which case it would be no offence to keep the boar; secondly, that
even if "animals" meant such animals as sheep, yet the declaration
ought to have averred mares; and that if a man kept a dog which
he knew would bite mares, and it afterwards bit a man, the owner
would not be liable. Powell, J., however, after the case bad been
argued several times, held, that if a man keeps a dog accustomed to
bite sheep, &c., and he knows it, and notwithstanding still keeps
the dog, and afterwards it bites a horse, this is actionable, notwith-
standing that the precedents are all of the same species, because
the owner, after notice of the first mischief, ought to have destroyed
him, or hindred him from doing any more hurt; that though the
declaration perhaps might have been bad on demurrer, yet it was
good after verdict; that the defendant knew that no evidence could
be given of any mischief done by the boar but that of which he
had notice; that it must be intended, after verdict, that evidence
was given of its biting such animals as sheep, and not dogs; at the
same time he thought there might be a difference between a boar
and a dog, because it is the nature of a dog to kill animals fera
naturea, as hares, cats, &c., but it is not natural to boars to kill
anything. In ilartley vs. Harriman, (1 B. & Al. 620,) the declara-
tion alleged that the defendant kept dogs which he knew would
worry sheep, and which worried those of the plaintiff; but the only
evidence given of previous worrying was, that the dogs had attacked
men. Lord Ellenborough said, that the plaintiff had tied up his
complaint by the allegation of the particular habits of the dogs,
and the defendant's knowledge of those habits; for unless it be in-
ferred that a dog, accustomed to attack men, is ipso facto accus-
tomed also to attack sheep, there was no evidence to support the
declaration; that he might, perhaps, have stated his ground of
action more generally, by alleging that these dogs were of a fero-
cious nature, and unsafe to be left at large; and that there was
evidence sufficient to shew that the knowledge which the defendant
had of these dogs ought to have imposed on him the duty of tying
them up; but that the plaintiff had stated a particular habit, and it
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'did not appear clearly either that the dogs had that habit, or that,
if they had, the defendant knew it. Bayley, J., said that the
declaration might have been framed more generally, and might
have stated that these were dogs of a ferocious and mischievous
description; but it was stated they were accustomed to bite sheep,
and there was no evidence of that. Abbott and Holroyd, JJ., were
of the same opinion, and a new trial was granted.
In aething vs. Morgan, (29 Law T. 106; reported as Gettring
"vs. Morgan, 5 Weekly Rep. 536,) which was a county court appeal,
the case stated that the action was for the defendant's dog worry-
ing the plaintiff's sheep, and that it was proved at the trial that the
defendant knew that four years before, the dog had bitten a child.
Lord Campbell, C. J., said, "I am of opinion that our judgment
should be given for the plaintiff, even according to the law of Eng-
land. According to the law of Scotland there is no occasion to
show the previous habits of the animal or the scienter ;" (see
Fleming vs. Orr, 2 Macq. 14;) "and where an injury has been
,done to an innocent person, it certainly seems more reasonable that
the loss should fall on the owner of the animal which has done the
mischief than upon the person injured; but I confine myself now
to the law of England. Now, in the county court there is no
declaration, but, according to .Hartley vs. Hfarriman, it would be
enough to allege that the dogs were of a ferocious disposition, to
the knowledge of the owner. Assuming the declaration to have
been in that form, .... there was enough to justify the judge in
concluding that the dogs were of a ferocious nature." Wightman,
J., said, "lThe biting of the child rendered it incumbent on the
:defendant to tohe care of the dogs." Erle, J., said, "This was not
a case for a nonsuit, s the biting of the child may have taken place
-tinder such circumstances as to give ample notice to the defendant
of the savage disposition of the dogs." And Crompton, J., said,
". There vas evidence for a jury. Generally, one act of ferocity is
enough to put the -owner on his guard; if he afterwards lets his
animals run about,'heimust be responsible." It appears, therefore,
that it 'matters not mlht 'class of creatures his animal has attacked;
* if the owner knows that the animal has acted in a way which the
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jury think should have given him warning that it was not to be
trusted, then such owner will be liable for any future injury to man
or beast which is occasioned by such animal, if the complaint be
properly laid in the declaration. The question is not whether, hav-
ing attacked one class, the owner is to be taken to have notice that
it will attack the particular class in respect of which the action is
brought; but whether the attack the owner knew of was one of such
a character, and under such circumstances, as, in the opinion of the
jury, would give the owner notice that his animal was not entirely
trustworthy. It will -be found, on examination, that in very many
of the cases evidence of instances in which the animal had made
one attack unknown to the plaintiff was admitted without any ques-
tion; the course adopted having apparently been to prove the ani-
mal's disposition by any instances, and then fix the owner with
knowledge by evidence of an instance within his own cognizance.
It is apprehended, however, that this course is erroneous, and that
the reception of such evidence might be successfully resisted; for,
as has been shown, the gist of the action is, not whether the animal
was dangerous, but whether the defendant knew it; and in deciding
that question the jury ought to be limited to evidence of what the
defendant knew, and not to be prejudiced in drawing their conclu-
sion by evidence which ought not to affect the defendant at all.
In most cases the evidence of the owner's knowledge has been
made out, by showing that the owner had seen or been informed of
a previous attack made by his animal. In one case, (Jones vs.
Perry, 2 Esp. 482,) however, where the question was, whether the
defendant's dog (which had bitten the plaintiff's child, who after-
wards died of hydrophobia,) was mad, and whether the defendant
knew it, Lord Kenyon went so far as to allow a witness to be asked
whether she had heard a report in the neighborhood that the dog in
question had been bitten by a mad dog, and held the defendant lia-
ble, though there was no other evidence of his knowledge even of
the report, beyond the fact of the dog being tied up by a chain long
enough to let him get into the street. But this case, it is appre-
hended, cannot be supported on any good grounds, and may be con-
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sidered of no authority. The admissions of the defendant, of
course, are evidence of his knowledge.
In Beck vs. Dyson, (4 Camp. 198,) where the evidence was, that
the defendant's dog was fierce and tied up, and that the defendant,
on hearing that it had bitten the plaintiff, promised to compensate
him, Lord Ellenborough nonsuited the plaintiff. This case, however,
must be considered as overruled by the case of Thomas vs. .Morgan,
(2 C., M. & R. 496,) .where the cofirt held, that though the fact of
the defendant's dogs having previously worried cattle was no evi-
dence to go to the jury, it was evidence to go to the jury that the
plaintiff, on being told of what his dogs had done, said he would
settle it; but at the same time they said that the evidence was so
sligbt, and ought, on being left to the jury, to have been accompa-
nied with such strong observations of the judge, that they refused
to grant a new trial.
In Judge vs. Cox, (1 Stark, 285,) where it appeared that the
defendant knew his dog was savage, had tied it up, and warned a
person to take care he was not bitten, Abbott, J., ruled that there
was evidence for the jury of his knowing that it had bitten man-
kind before.
And in Hudson vs. Boberts, (6 East, 697,) where the declaration
alleged that the defendant knew his bull was accustomed to attack
mankind, and was dangerous to drive in a public highway, but that
he did so drive it, and it injured the plaintiff; and it appeared that
the plaintiff wore a red neckerchief, which irritated the animal, and
that the defendant had, after the accident, said to one person, "he
knew the bull would run at anything red," and to another, "that
he knew a bull would run at anything red ;" the court held, that
there was evidence of the scienter for the jury, and said, that, even
if he had only made use of the latter expression, they thought
'there would have been evidence.
